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1 ABSTRACT 
 
This article uses the example of computer systems for large-scale ARIANE test benches to show 
how data are reliably, safely and continuously acquired, stored and managed in order to have them 
ready for further evaluations that are reproducible and understandable at all times. 
 
Computer systems for large ESA test benches have very distinctive characteristics. One of their 
essential features is, of course, that the individual sub-processes complete their tasks within very 
short time. But next to speed determinism is of equal significance. It means, for example, that 
redline conditions are monitored in exactly the given cycle and that command sequences are 
reproducibly executed at exactly the defined times in order to make the workflows at the test bench 
run the way the physical and chemical processes demand it. The actual capturing of data belongs 
under this kind of subtasks, and usually real-time operating systems are employed to accomplish 
them. Other jobs running in parallel, like data distribution, storage and visualization, are performed 
on customary computer systems as they are better suited for this kind of application. 
 
Quality requirements put on such computer systems are really high as the test results of past 
decades must remain comparable. So, transparency and reproducibility are essential issues to be 
safeguarded for every test executed. The performance standards of the systems also show in the 
entire hardware and software components' availability throughout the year and in the guarantee that 
no test data can be manipulated or even lost. 
 
It needs a special hardware and software design to afford such guarantees as all data stream paths, 
e.g. from the sensors or command/event interfaces all the way down to the archive file, need to be 
set up safely and probably even redundantly. This safety and, with it, the certainty that the entire 
digitalized data are fully available at all times is ensured by different internal layers of hardware and 
software functions. Some of those functions are based on standard technology and adapted for the 
specific purpose while others are specially tailored for a certain application scenario. 
 
For DLR's test site in Lampoldshausen the company Werum Software & Systems in cooperation 
with partners has built several of such systems that fulfil the above mentioned requirements. The 
following article uses the solution for the P5 test bench as example to describe the system's intrinsic 
design principles. Apart from technical solutions, however, administrative aspects are of equal 
importance to ensure reliable operation over many years. For this reason, the second part of the 
article addresses such aspects and may also be regarded as "best practice" for successful projects. 
 
2 ABOUT WERUM SOFTWARE & SYSTEMS 
 
Werum Software & Systems AG is based in Lueneburg, South of Hamburg. With a workforce of 
over 120, it is one of the largest independent employers for IT professionals in Germany. For more 
than 45 years Werum has been implementing sophisticated software and systems for a worldwide 
base of customers, among them many renowned companies from the automotive and aerospace 
industry as well as scientific institutions and public authorities. 
 
Werum's activities 
 
Werum's activities focus on the support of customer-specific processes in the core areas of test data 
and information management, earth observation, eGovernment and enterprise information 
management. The software solutions are based on platforms specially developed for these areas. 
 
Their aerospace-related activities started far back in 1993 with a measurement data management 
system for experiments of the STS-55 Space Shuttle mission, also known as D2 Spacelab mission. 
Also ESA's ROSETTA mission with the comet landing probe PHILAE was supported by Werum's 
software. Another focus is on systems for processing and handling satellite data, which are 
employed in many missions of European and international space agencies (e.g. ENVISAT, 
TerraSAR-X, Sentinel-1 & Sentinel-3 etc.). 
 
Space engine test bench projects 
 
This article, however, concentrates on systems for the execution of tests for space propulsion 
engines. In this area, too, Werum can look back on many years of experience in various projects. 
The first system developed for DLR was a corresponding system for their site in Trauen, Lower 
Saxony. Systems of markedly higher complexity followed in quick succession for many of DLR's 
research test beds in Lampoldshausen. The highlights of this cooperation so far are the 
Measurement, Control and Command systems (MCC) for the VULCAIN main engine of ARIANE 
5 at the P5 test bench (since 2007) and a similar system for testing the upper stage of ARIANE 6 
(since 2017) at the P5.2 test bench. The tasks and the typical setup of such a system are described in 
the next section. 
 
3 BASIC MCC CONCEPT 
 
As a general rule, MCC systems are employed not only for test execution with hundreds or even 
thousands of analogue and digital IO points, but also for the preparation and subsequent follow-up 
of tests. As a result, there is a set of most diverse tasks an MCC system has to fulfil: 
 
• Configuration and management of sensors (PA, PD, PR, V, TC, Pt, D) 
• Configuration and management of actors 
• Configuration and modification of hardware limits (cabling and amplifier types) 
• Validation of data base entries 
• Configuration and management of acquisition plans 
• Creation of programs and sequences 
• Creation of redline conditions 
• Configuration management and storage 
• Measurement data acquisition 
• Creation of measurement cross sections 
• Keeping of an automatic logbook 
• Storage of data according to acquisition plans 
• Data distribution (measurement data, logbook messages, status and commands) 
• Monitoring of redline conditions 
• Execution and suspending of programs and/or sequences on demand 
• Automated control of actors 
• Provision of a standardized time base for data storage, sequence execution and redline 
monitoring 
• Online display of test parameters (e.g. measurement data or valve positions) in synoptics 
• Online logbook display, logbook freeze function and string searching by SQL instructions 
• Online trend display for preselected channels 
• Active commanding of actors (e.g. valves) by the user 
• Self-monitoring of all relevant MCC components 
• Logbook export for defined time range 
• Export of measurement data in different file formats for external analysis tools 
• Data backup 
 
These tasks are distributed across several computer systems that may vary considerably and are 
assigned to different levels: 
 
• Frontend level (FEL) 
• Data management level (DML) 
• Operator level (OPL) 
 
Distribution makes it possible to choose the computer system that is suited best for the task at hand. 
The tasks of measurement data acquisition, sequence execution, redline monitoring and actor 
control, for example, are executed on special real-time systems, so-called frontend systems, in order 
to ensure that the necessary cycle times are observed. As opposed to this, it's customary PC systems 
that can show their strengths when it comes to online displays at the operator terminals. For data 
storage and distribution, special server systems are used that are optimized for high data throughput 
rates and also run database systems, for example. 
 
Some of the tasks mentioned can be assigned to individual computer systems while others call for 
an interoperation of all levels. Fig. 1 shows the levels the different tasks are primarily assigned to. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Tasks assignment 
 
This way of distributing tasks inevitably involves a modular overall system which ensures that the 
impact future changes and extensions have is limited to only few, directly affected components. 
 
The distribution of tasks across several systems can also be utilized to increase fail-safety. 
Moreover, the presence of several operator terminals, for example, makes it possible for different 
users to work in parallel. Last but not least, the use of several computer systems allows for load 
balancing, thereby increasing the overall system's scalability. 
 
Wherever possible and reasonable, standard hardware and software components are employed. As a 
result of this, costs are reduced, the systems are open to meet future needs and single-supplier 
dependency is minimized. 
 
The components of the MCC are linked by powerful networks. Fig. 2 shows the basic setup of an 
MCC including the major data flows between the levels. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Basic MCC setup 
 
4 ERROR HANDLING 
 
Important factors for the reliability and availability of a MCC certainly are robustness and a high 
quality of the hardware and software components. 
 
Self-monitoring 
 
Equally essential, however, is the system's self-monitoring functionality that ensures that error 
states are detected unfailingly. It's the only way to have automated error handling processes started 
or to have the user informed about the presence of an error so he or she can take a decision and 
respond adequately. 
 
After all, a time-consuming and costly test run should under no circumstances be started with a 
deficient system that entails the risk of having to terminate a test or of jeopardizing the safety of 
humans, the test bed or the unit under test. 
 
In case of an error 
 
If an error occurs in a test run, the desired automatic error handling procedure usually is the 
automated execution of the stop sequence that puts the test bed and the unit under test into safe 
condition. The MCC might still be able to do it on its own – provided its sequence generator still 
works properly. As it's not possible to guarantee that for any conceivable error scenario, MCC 
systems are frequently extended by adding a so-called Emergency Stop Systems (ESS) which 
presents the last fall-back level to accomplish a safe shutdown. 
 
An ESS is triggered by the absence of a heartbeat signal which the MCC sends to the ESS while in 
normal operation. When designing an ESS, it's advisable to pursue a hardware and software concept 
that is at variance with that of the MCC to prevent that the same error can occur in both systems. 
 
5 REDUNDANCY 
 
The availability of an MCC can be increased by a redundant component structure. In an ideal setup, 
the backup system seamlessly takes over in case of an error, thereby enabling successful completion 
of an already started test. The definitions to be made first in laying out the system, are the desired 
degree of redundancy and the specific components to be redundant. In case of the MCCs for P5 and 
P5.2, it was the data management level that was implemented redundantly. On operator level, 
redundancy is constituted by the large number of equivalent operator terminals so that any failure of 
a terminal can easily be compensated for. Fig. 3 illustrates the redundancy concept of the P5 test 
bed with its so-called redundant DML halves. 
 
 
Fig. 3: MCC with DML redundancy in nominal operation 
 
When designing an MCC, redundancy should be considered from the very beginning as it does not 
suffice to just let MCC components run in parallel. Not only must the redundant MCC components 
monitor themselves, they also have to exchange status information and take the correct actions in 
case of an error. 
 
If subcomponents within one DML half fail, identifying the correct actions is rather easy. So, when 
the database system on the main side fails, for example, operation altogether switches over to the 
backup system. If it is the database system on the redundant side that fails, however, the backup 
system will be marked as being unavailable in order to prevent any switchover to the unhealthy side 
in the sequel. 
 
Communication problems on status or data connections between the two halves pose a major 
challenge in identifying adequate response as they may in principle have different causes: 
 
1. Problems on the main side - (e.g. damaged network card) 
2. Problems on the main side - (e.g. complete failure of the side) 
3. Problems in the wiring - (e.g. damaged cable) 
4. Problems on the redundant side - (e.g. damaged network card) 
5. Problems on the redundant side - (e.g. complete failure of the side) 
 
In case of no. 2, a switchover to the backup system would definitely be reasonable, while in case no. 
5 trying to switch over to the unhealthy backup system would certainly be the wrong decision. In 
the cases no. 1, 3 and 4 the problem is confined to the communication between the two halves and 
either half on its own is functional. The difficulty is that it sometimes is impossible for a 
communication partner to identify the reason for the communication problem without doubt or 
within the necessary period of time. And, what is more, the error has an effect on both sides and 
both sides consequently must respond in some way. Therefore, it is essential to develop a suitable 
logic that ensures that the responses are compatible so as to maintain proper working order for at 
least one half and to have no incorrect conclusions drawn 
 
The solution for the P5 MCC is the following: only the half active at a time maintains a connection 
to the FEL. The data received through this connection are mirrored from the DML Main (DMLM) 
to the DML Redundant (DMLR). The switchover to the backup system in case of an error is always 
triggered by the backup system. The main system can only solicit a switchover from the backup 
system. This is the reason why the two DML halves continuously exchange status signals via a 
dedicated network connection which is independent in terms of hardware. 
 
Should the main side detect an error in the communication with the DMLR (e.g. the non-appearance 
of a status signal), the DMLM will assume the DMLR to be unhealthy and abstain from requesting 
a switchover to the DMLR from that point. The problematic connection will consequently not be 
used any longer, no matter which of the above events occurred. As far as the DMLM considers 
itself to be healthy, it will continue performing its tasks as before. 
 
If the DMLR detects a connection problem and regards itself as healthy, the switchover will be 
carried out. Here, too, the problematic connection stops being used. Instead, the DMLR sets up its 
own connection to the FEL, thereby cutting the connections between FEL and DMLM. This 
disconnection also has the effect that the DMLM – despite the missing status connection – is 
indirectly informed of the DMLR's taking over and changes to the "unhealthy" status. The situation 
after a switchover is depicted in Fig. 4. 
 
 Fig. 4: MCC with DML redundancy after switchover 
 
Another important aspect in designing a redundant system is command control. Commands can be 
sent by the user at an operator terminal. The DML receives the commands and passes them on to 
the FEL. Should it happen that a switchover takes place at the precise moment the command is sent, 
the command must be certain to reach its destination, but it must reach it only once. To visualize 
possible consequences if it didn't just imagine what would happen if a valve was erroneously 
toggled twice or a sequence was started twice. 
 
6 DATA ORGANISATION AND BACKUP CONCEPTS 
 
The demand for reliable operation over years with reproducible and always comprehensible results 
puts special requirements on the handling and the organization of data. The term "data" in this 
context is a rather general term and it's worth considering the different categories of data. 
 
First and foremost, it's the integrity of software components that is important for reliable operation. 
Among the components relevant to ensure it are the operating system installations on the various 
computer systems, the specific MCC application software and the associated configuration files. 
Within the scope of maintenance activities, backups of those components are created periodically in 
the form of images. If it comes to the worst, they can be used to restore a system in a minimum of 
time. 
 
A suitable configuration management suits to fulfil the demand for reproducibility. Special 
databases or commercial version control systems are employed for this purpose. Next to sensor, 
amplifier and actor parameters they also accommodate items like sequences, redlines and 
information on test runs. This approach makes sure that a test can be repeated at some date in the 
future with the same configuration. The configuration management is organized in a three-level tree 
structure that is divided into campaigns with configuration revisions arranged below them and the 
test runs below the configuration revisions. 
 
One of the tasks the configuration management is co-responsible for is traceability, which ensures 
that even after years, sensor parameters or sequences, for example, can still be viewed and allocated 
to a specific test run. 
 
The measurement data of the MCC are stored as raw data in archive files together with sensor and 
amplifier parameters. The set of data forms an inseparable unit that admits of independent 
evaluation. As the data stored are raw data subsequent re-processing is possible, e.g. if a sensor 
calibration turns out to be invalid. 
 
The logbook is implemented by a special database. Consequently, database tools can be used to 
browse it. 
 
The data storage is located on the DML servers. They are equipped with commercial RAID systems 
which automatically duplicate the data and mitigate the impact of a possible hard disk crash. This 
ensures safety of the data as well as smooth continuation of operations. 
 
The P5 MCC setup includes redundant DML servers which store the data in parallel. This way, the 
data are duplicated twice in normal operation. 
 
Automatic tools are available to perform the periodic backup of user data (configuration data, 
database contents including logbook and measurement data files). They can transfer the data to a 
commercial NAS system located in a different fire compartment. 
 
Over the years, terabytes of data accumulate in operating the MCC – especially due to high 
frequency acquisition. In order to release the MCC resources for new test runs, campaigns can be 
selected to transfer the associated measurement data and logbook entries to an external system, such 
as an NAS system. In the event that those data are needed in the MCC again at some other time, 
they can easily be re-imported using the available MCC tools. 
 
7 LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The article at hand so far attended to the technical aspects creating the basis for a stable system of 
high availability and reliability. When it comes to operating a complex hardware and software 
system for many years, though, there also are organizational aspects that need to be considered. In 
particular, it's more than helpful if the MCC manufacturer has been established in the market for 
many years and there is a fair chance that they can support the product's lifecycle for quite some 
time. 
 
In the following, we go into the details about aspects and measures that have contributed 
significantly to the P5 MCC project's success of many years. 
 
Spare parts 
 
MCC systems in general consist of multiple computer systems. With the P5 and P5.2 MCCs they 
amount to a total of about 30. This number clearly indicates that single failures are to be expected 
sooner or later when running a system for many years. Therefore, it's advisable to lay in an ample 
stock of spare parts so that the components concerned can be replaced or repaired at any time. The 
endeavour is to use high-quality standard components for the computer systems. But for the FEL 
real-time systems in particular, very specially geared hardware components are employed which 
may have a lead time of many weeks; a circumstance that illustrates how important it is to have 
spare parts in stock. 
 
Another reason for holding stocks of spare parts is potential obsolescence (see below) which may 
mean that certain spare parts are no longer available on the market at all. Often enough there are 
alternative products to use, but they may entail a modification of configurations, for example, or the 
installation of different drivers. With spare parts of the same type in stock this kind of trouble can 
be avoided as the components can be replaced simply by plug & play. 
 
A further advantage available spare parts offer is that components can be exchanged on a trial basis, 
which is a suitable approach to narrow down error causes when there is an unclear error situation. 
 
Maintenance 
 
Similar to modern cars, advanced computer systems require only little maintenance, but are not free 
of it. Regular maintenance ensures that reliable operation of a system with the accustomed qualities 
is possible for many years. For maintenance, the individual components are inspected thoroughly 
under a series of different aspects: 
 
• Visual inspection of the components 
• Inspection of the operating system's log files 
• Inspection of the application software's log files 
• Abnormal development of noise with fans or hard disks which could point towards 
imminent failure 
• Checking for and removal of dust, also inside the computer housing 
• Checking of hard disk capacities 
• Checking of IO board calibrations 
• Checking of spare part stock 
 
The results of the maintenance operations are summarized in a report that also makes 
recommendations for further actions. 
 
Obsolescence 
 
Especially in the world of computers technology is moving fast, which holds true for hardware, 
software and (logical) interfaces between components. It frequently happens, for example, that 
computers and screens are no longer available in exactly the same design after just one year, but are 
replaced by new types. This does not pose any problems as long as the successor model is fully 
compatible. 
 
New computer models, however, often support only current operating systems because the required 
drivers of new hardware components, for instance, are no longer developed to work with older 
operating systems. If a computer needs to be purchased because the old device is defective or a 
system extension is desired, the fact that the application software is unqualified for the new 
operating system may pose a serious problem. 
 
The example suits to emphasize how important obsolescence management is if an MCC system is 
supposed to run reliably for years or even decades. The first step in establishing obsolescence 
management is to observe the market in order to spot possible cases of obsolescence in the first 
place. Based on the findings, suitable actions can be defined and implemented in the next two steps. 
Some possible measures are: 
 
• Replenish spare parts stocks as long as the parts are still available 
• Integrate successor models on a trial basis to be prepared for emergencies 
• Exchange all components concerned, which frequently is attended with a gain in 
performance in case of computers 
• Design a new setup for the subsystem concerned that does not need the part affected by 
obsolescence 
 
The first three measures have already been implemented successfully in the P5 MCC project, 
depending on the specific situation. Owing to the design, it has not yet become necessary to create a 
completely new concept for any of the subsystems. 
 
Obsolescence management is a continuous process. Necessary actions should not be deferred too 
long as, otherwise, there will be a serious backlog in technology and investments. So, regular 
replacement of computer systems is advisable not only to guard against the risk of failures due to 
advancing age, but also to prevent operating systems from lagging generations behind and to profit 
from technological progress. 
 
Continuous improvements 
 
As a general rule, the demands made on a test bench vary over the years. Especially with test 
benches for research and development purposes it often happens that requirements on channel 
numbers are added or devices with new interfaces that should be connected. Here, it definitely pays 
off if the MCC, too, has a modular and scalable design. In the past 10 years, the P5 MCC underwent 
several extensions and was brought up to date so that it can now be used for the VULCAIN 2.1 
engine of the new ARIANE 6. 
 
But it's not only the major extensions that are vital in ensuring that the test bench and the MCC 
meet varying requirements at all times. Improvement management, too, is a continuous process that 
is of equal relevance and requires regular communication between customer and manufacturer. A 
suitable way of handling it is to hold periodic meetings at which both parties can swap ideas and 
views on latest developments, requirements, experiences or technical opportunities. The 
information gathered can then serve as basis to deduce suitable planning steps. 
 
As a matter of fact, though, improvements are only one side of the coin. There is a high likelihood 
that errors occasionally occur with systems as complex as the MCC. They may be errors of the 
actual system, errors caused by connected external systems or errors caused by operating mistakes 
or a lack of understanding. What all these error categories have in common is that immediate and 
direct contact to the manufacturer is indispensable in order to start error analysis and repair right 
away. The best way of tackling it is to conclude a maintenance contract which makes it possible to 
set to work without delay and without the need for either side to clear administrative or other 
hurdles first. 
 
Training 
 
Intensive training usually is integral part of the overall project for a complex computer system. 
Even with supposedly simple applications like text-processing systems only a fraction of the dearly 
paid functions is used - depending on the user's level of knowledge. Complex MCC systems are 
designed to perform expensive test runs in a manner that the safety of humans and machines is 
protected. Therefore, efficient mastering of the systems is essential for reliable operation and 
expenditure for a well-trained team should not be regarded as a cost factor but as an increase in the 
investment's value. 
 
For various reasons, though, users should be trained not only during the commissioning phase but 
also afterwards whenever the need arises. The number of persons operating large test benches over 
time is large and staff turnovers are commonplace. So, new team members should be imparted a 
similar level of knowledge as experienced team members have it. 
 
For experienced staff, too, training courses may prove beneficial as they can brush up or deepen 
their knowledge. Many questions or the desire to go more into details don't manifest until first 
working experiences have been gathered with a new system and then it's a good opportunity to have 
an expert available to discuss the issues with. 
 
8 SUMMARY 
 
This article explains the basic design principles of the MCC that has been operated successfully at 
the P5 test bench at the DLR test area in Lampoldshausen for many years. The second part goes into 
the details about some organizational aspects which, strictly speaking, apply to any hardware and 
software system of high complexity. But especially when reliable operation of the overall system 
must be guaranteed over a number of years, these factors are crucial next to a solid technical 
solution. 
 
9 ACRONYMS 
 
AI Analogue Input Channel – view from the MCC 
AO Analogue Output Channel – view from the MCC 
D D sensor type - strain gauges, supplied by voltage 
DI Digital Input Channel [e.g. event from the test bench] – view from the MCC 
DLR German Aerospace Center 
DML Data Management Level 
DO Digital Output Channel [e.g. command or trigger pulse] – view from the MCC 
ESA European Space Agency 
ESS Emergency Stop Systems 
FEL Frontend Level 
IO Input Output Interface points 
IT Information Technology 
MCC System for Measurement, Control and Command 
OPL Operator Level 
PA Pressure Absolute 
PC Personal Computer 
PD Pressure Differential 
PR Pressure Rapid 
Pt Platinum element supplied by constant current 
RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks 
TC Thermocouple 
V Vibration sensor 
